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ESSAY
PRIVACY AND CELEBRITY: AN ESSAY ON THE
NATIONALIZATION OF INTIMACY
Robert F. Nagel *

I.
I start from the rather obvious proposition that in recent years the
American public has placed a high value on the right of privacy.
This general commitment to privacy was what kept Robert Bork,
despite his qualifications, off the Supreme Court, and more recently
it was what kept William Clinton, despite his behavior, in the White
House. Bork's nomination was a threat to the constitutional right
to use contraceptives and to choose abortion, while the impeachment
charges against Clinton were a threat to the moral distinction
between public political life and private sexual behavior. The power
that the idea of privacy holds in contemporary society is, as
everyone knows, evident in many other events and trends as well.
It fuels the dramatic changes now underway in the cultural and
legal status of homosexuality. It underlies challenges to ingrained
assumptions about appropriate conduct within the military. Of
course, it also sustains the right-to-die movement.
Just as obvious, but more odd, is the fact that our society's high
valuation of privacy coexists with an almost equally widespread
passion for celebrity status and other forms of public exposure.
Indeed, these two apparently opposite commitments often are
expressed simultaneously. Clinton, for instance, has always used
his prodigious energy and skill to personalize the presidency. Thus
it was Clinton, the same man who successfully claimed that his
sexual encounters in the oval office were part of his private life, who
years earlier in a televised "town meeting" blithely answered one
young woman's teasing question about the kind of underwear he
wore. The public that revels in the personal quality of its relation* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law; Director, Byron R. White
Center for American Constitutional Study, University of Colorado School of Law.
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ship with President Clinton also insists that his private life is off
limits. Conversely, some of those who condemned Bork as a threat
to the right to privacy rummaged through his video records to find
indications about his personal life.
This simultaneous demand for privacy and publicness is not some
peculiarity specific to the American people's admiration for Clinton
or their hostility toward Bork. Consider the fact that those who
favor the right of access to abortion in professionalized medical
settings often believe that states should be precluded from requiring
minor females to discuss the abortion decision with parents in the
seclusion of the home. Or think about how gay-rights advocates
occasionally combine a belief in private sexual liberty with support
for the involuntary "outing" of closet homosexuals and, indeed, often
demand that school children be exposed to highly public programs
about homosexuality.
The very ambivalence of the public's attitude toward privacy
contains a certain explanatory potential. Thus, it is often thought
that the current popularity of the right to privacy is a reaction
against the constant demand for exposure that characterizes
modern life. At least since the famous article by Warren and
Brandeis in the 1890 HarvardLaw Review, observers have urged
that important moral considerations underlie the individual's need
to control the extent to which "thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
shall be communicated to others."1 "Privacy" in this sense is
commonly believed to be at special risk under modern conditions
chiefly because technological advances provide unprecedented
opportunities for gathering and disseminating information. The
administrative state compounds these risks because of its prodigious
capacity to collect and store information about the lives it regulates
and services so pervasively.
Paradoxically, however, this kind of privacy, as much as it seems
threatened today, has not found much favor with the public or the
courts. Indeed, it is public exposure, the opposite of privacy in this
conventional sense, that is hungrily sought throughout our culture
and is energetically protected by the courts as an aspect of freedom

1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
198 (1890). For more recent, related themes, see Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980), and Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
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of speech.2 What the constitutional right to privacy actually protects
and what the public apparently wants is not privacy in the conventional sense of insulation or concealment, but a set of personal
liberties that are thought to be especially important.3 These include,
of course, the right to sexual freedom (because, some say, sexuality
is crucial to individual identity), the right to reproductive freedom
(because that freedom, say others, is crucial for preventing the
government from asserting totalitarian control over people's lives),
the right to refuse medical treatment (because of the importance of
bodily autonomy), and so on. Once the right to privacy is understood to refer to certain favored liberties, the paradox of the populace's simultaneous commitments to privacy and publicness
dissolves into a single strong commitment to personal liberty.
Americans expect to know about President Clinton's underwear
because we have a robust tradition of free speech. Similarly,
Americans believe Clinton's sex life should be private because we
also have a robust tradition of sexual freedom. The issue, conceived
in this way, is the familiar one of reconciling two competing strands
of a single, overriding commitment to liberty. And in the instance
of Clinton's impeachment, that reconciliation is easy: Clinton is not
to be sanctioned for his sexual conduct, and people are free to read
everything they can about that conduct. Admittedly, the reconciliation is not always so easy. Two liberties, obviously, can be in direct
competition, as when the right to picket competes with the right to
abortion. But even in these more difficult circumstances, it seems
that multiple aspects of a commitment to individual liberty are
exposed, not two deeply contradictory impulses that may be feeding
on one another.
Under this view of privacy-as-liberty, the development rather late
in this century of a constitutional right to privacy tends to be

2. See, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 855 (1997); Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,50-51 (1988); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,48789 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1967). The occasional small effort to
confine the wild race for publication serves mainly to emphasize how far we have gone as a
society in favoring disclosure over privacy. How, for example, did it become an accepted
practice for police to invite along private television crews to record forced entries and arrests?
See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999). For an account of how, in general, the Fourth
Amendment has come to stand as abureaucratic process that authorizes invasions of privacy
with insufficient regard for the nature of the information at issue, see Akhil Reed Amar,
FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757, 761-63, 800-07 (1994).
3. See generallyJed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737 (1989); Joel
Feinberg,Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?,58 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 445 (1983).
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explained on the basis of the new and dangerous opportunities for
oppression that were opened up by the regulatory state. For
example, Bruce Ackerman explains the right to use contraceptives
by posing this question: "Given New Deal activism, what remained
of the Founding values of individual sdlf-determination formerly
expressed in the language of property and contract?"4 His answer
is that in Griswold v. Connecticut,5 Justice Douglas "mark[ed] out
marriage as an appropriate context for re-presenting the continuing
constitutional value of liberty inherited from the Founding."6 In a
similar, but even more dramatic vein, Jed Rubenfeld traces the rise
of the right to privacy to the fact that "now governmental power has
so expanded that it affirmatively shapes our lives with the potential
for total control."' Interestingly, jurists and free speech theorists
have made similar claims about why the right to publish should be
given wide protections under the First Amendment. Thus, the
images of systematic repression that drove the civil libertarian
proposals of thinkers like Thomas Emerson were based on the
excesses of mobilized wartime governments here or totalitarian
governments abroad.'
The notion that the personal liberties called "privacy" and
"speech" need special protection because of the broad regulatory
powers of modern government is apparently self-evident, possibly
because of background influences like George Orwell's Nineteen
Eighty-Four.9 We are now far enough past that ominous date to at
least consider the possibility, which one would have expected to be
congenial all along to supporters of the New Deal and the subsequent expansion of governmental power, that personal liberties may
have been enhanced by government activism. Some glaring facts
must be taken into account. For example, during significant periods
in our history, laws against adultery and homosexuality were
widespread and at times severely enforced; today, they are rare or
largely unenforced. For most of our history, marital relationships
were rigidly defined; today, not only is marriage more easily begun
and ended, but a wider range of roles are viewed as compatible with
being a spouse or parent. Much the same can be said of the right to
publish. Obscenity prosecutions, commonplace only a few decades

4. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 152 (1991).

5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 155.
7. Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 807.
8. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 205-15 (1970).
9. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
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ago, are now rare. Profanity, fighting words, group vilification, and
other forms of speech that were once suppressed are now as routine
as bumper stickers. In short, on a historically comparative basis, we
are a country awash in the liberties called "privacy" and "speech."
The judiciary's efforts to protect individuals from the administrative
state have no doubt played some part in causing this flowering (or
decay, as you like). But those efforts are also a reflection of the
mores of the times. And the high valuation of personal freedoms
that is so central a part of those mores might be, at least in part, a
political and cultural consequence of the material wealth and
economic security generated during the era of the administrative
state.
It is understandable, perhaps, that the public, including jurists
and legal scholars, might believe that privacy and speech are
precarious under modern conditions even if the expansion of these
rights is, in fact, being spawned by those same conditions. The
abundance and popularity of these liberties mean that people are
aware of them, and awareness itself is a precondition to fearing loss.
Moreover, not only is it true that the modern state is powerful, but
it is also true that within recent memory some of these currently
favored liberties were relatively scarce. Still, the easy and largely
unexamined belief that the administrative state presents a severe
threat to privacy and speech tends to deflect attention from the fact
that, to a considerable degree, those liberties have been successfully
established and have become widely popular during the era of
affirmative government.
In sum, while a misnamed but naturally flourishing version of
privacy-as-liberty is honored everywhere as an essential right,
"privacy" in its conventional sense is subordinated to an overwhelming demand for unrestrained publication. As the simultaneous
insistence on privacy and publicness that is so dramatically
embodied in President Clinton illustrates, modern American society
energetically protects what maybe secure and wantonly tosses away
what is probably at risk. From this perspective, it seems possible
that the legal prominence of "personal rights" is a consequence of
the conditions of modern life as much as it is a protection against
those conditions. If so, one question that arises is whether constitutional privacy and public intimacy are related in any way other than
as dual aspects of devotion to liberty.
My answer to this question is straightforward. I propose that one
aspect of modern life that gives rise to the simultaneous demand for
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personal liberty and public intimacy is centralization, both political
and cultural. Moreover, I suggest that the expansion of the personal
liberty called "privacy" generates a need for more public intimacy,
and that, in turn, the growth of public intimacy generates a need for
more personal liberty. Finally, I describe how personal liberty and
public intimacy produce even greater centralization, thus fueling an
implosive cycle.
II.
These are rather grand and, perhaps, improbable claims, but I can
begin to explain them with an everyday observation. If you walk
down hallways in the buildings of the University of Colorado, where
I work, sooner or later you will pass an office with a small sign
visible through a glass partition. The sign announces that the office
is a "Hate-Free Zone." One might expect that this somewhat selfsatisfied declaration would create a stir. On the one hand, it is a
proud statement about a very serious matter; on the other, it
implies that the rest of the building, no matter how quiet and
apparently benign at the moment, is hate-filled. Most people,
however, seem to ignore the sign; at least, I have never observed
anyone showing a reaction one way or another. This kind of sign,
along with others announcing smoke-free zones, drug-free zones,
and gun-free zones, are such common occurrences around the
country that they seem a natural and unremarkable part of the
cultural landscape. They are worth a moment's reflection.
Part of what makes the announcement in the 'hate-free" office at
the University of Colorado so odd, and almost forlorn, is its extreme
localization. This little, glassed-in space-surrounded by so many
other offices, and then by other buildings, and then by an unruly
town, and then by a vast state and a looming nation-is hate-free.
If the jurisdiction is tiny, however, the claim is large. Implicit in the
word "free," repeated elsewhere for so many different causes, is a
claim of perfection. Hate is not discouraged, not penalized, not
minimized, not even regretted. Hate, if only in this little domain, is
absent. Herein lies another source of the oddness of these everyday
signs, for, in fact, there are drugs and guns in many schools,
including those announcing otherwise, and even the good people
who work in those hate-free offices cannot all be completely innocent
of hatred. As specific as their pronouncements of perfection may be,
the signs are not descriptive, but utopian.
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The perfectionist impulse, narrowed and localized as it is in a
small 'hate-free" office, is nevertheless traceable, in part, to national
decision-making. Not many years ago, for instance, the Supreme
Court invalidated the Colorado anti-gay-rights initiative called
"Amendment 2," declaring that the only imaginable explanation for
it was the animosity that hundreds of thousands of voters must
have felt for homosexuals. ° Because of this decision and a complex
array of other factors, including the successful nationalization of
antidiscrimination policies on race, gender, and disability, discrimination against homosexuals has become a prominent item on the
agendas of Congress and the President. A national law signed by
President Clinton now protects the authority of states to restrict
marriage to heterosexual relationships." A range of laws prohibiting employment and housing discrimination against homosexuals
has been proposed, but, so far, has not been enacted. 2 Thus, with
the three branches of the national government partially fueling and
partially frustrating the political program of the gay-rights movement, it was only natural that reformist energy should be redirected
at different and smaller jurisdictions. That this energy should
eventually be localized in a forlornly small hate-free office is itself
partly a reflection of the fact that intermediate state institutions
had been rendered morally suspect by the nation's highest court.
As the size of the jurisdiction diminished, however, the scale of
reformist aspiration could grow. Large, diverse populations, after
all, inevitably contain prejudices and hatreds. It would simply
never occur to anyone to label the United States as a whole "hatefree" with respect to homosexuals or virtually any other group.
Even at the less utopian level of antidiscrimination policy, the
national government has resisted the moral claims of gay-rights
advocates. But gay-rights advocates could realistically pursue a
more morally ambitious program (including, for instance, the
provision of a social center, sensitivity training, etc.) within the
much smaller and more homogeneous community of the University.
And, at the level of a single office, even the banishment of hatred
can be imagined and proclaimed. Thus, to the extent that the

10. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996).
11. See Defense ofMarriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199,110 Stat. 2419 (1996). See generally
Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMAtL Why the Defense ofMarriageActis Unconstitutional,
83 IOWA L. REV.1 (1997).

12. See, e.g., EmploymentNon-DiscriminationActof 1997,H.R. 1858,105thCong. (1997);
Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1997, H.R. 365, 105th Cong. (1997).
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reformist impulse behind the "hate-free zone" sign is perfectionist,
extreme localism is a natural consequence.
Ifas I have suggested, the "hate-free" office at the University of
Colorado can be seen as a strikingly small jurisdiction aspiring to
limited perfection, it has much in common with the constitutional
right to personal liberty that has come to be called the "right to
privacy." These rights, too, represent the radical localization-in a
couple, a family, a school, an individual, or a doctor's office-of a
limited set of important matters, such as sexuality, marriage, childraising, education, contraception, or abortion.'
Moreover, this
localization is at least in part a function of perfectionism, which is
evident, for example, in the argument that the right to engage in
sexual intimacies is "'central to . .. the development of human
personality""4 and in the even more exalted argument that the right
to abortion enables individuals to define their "own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life."' 5 The theme in the privacy cases is not that all radically
localized decisions will be perfect but that only in extreme localization is there any possibility of personal completion or fulfillment.
The right allows for control of a relatively narrow range of behaviors, but the aspiration is utopian.
There is, of course, nothing distinctively modern about the
aspiration for personal fulfillment. But, as De Tocqueville foresaw,
the availability of material wealth increases the range and scale of
human desires. 6 By the second half of this century, masses of
Americans could afford to travel, to become educated, to enjoy
leisure, and to live in comfort. It is surely no coincidence that it was
during this period of unprecedented material well-being that the
Supreme Court began announcing and developing the constitutional
right to privacy. In earlier less-heady days it was only natural for
state and local governments to be considered appropriate settings
13. One commentator revealingly compared the concept of autonomy in the privacy cases
with the idea of sovereignty or nationhood. See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 446-57. In this
scheme, each individual is "a domain or territory in which the self is sovereign." Id. at 452.
This area includes not only the body itself, but an area of control around the body "analogous
perhaps to offshore fishing rights." Id. at 453. Thus individuals are conceived of as small
sovereign countries that are separated from one another, not by armies, but by a legal right
to privacy.
14. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
15. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
16. See ALEXISDETOCQUEVLLE,M4EMOIRONPAUPERISM 48-50 (Seymour Dreschertrans.,
Ivan R. Dee, Inc. 1997) (1968).
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for decisions about sexual behavior, education, abortion, and so on.
The assumption was that individuals' choices and goals should be
limited and structured through law and by the political deliberations that went into shaping law. Some, like those forced to bear
unwanted children because of prohibitions against abortion, would
find their lives changed profoundly, but frustration and imperfection
were expected. Collectively-imposed moral constraints were simply
one more limitation in a world full of limitations. As aspirations for
self-fulfillment grew, however, imperfections created by decision
making within these larger jurisdictions began to seem intolerable.
The utopian localization inherent in the constitutional right to
privacy reflects this broader change in attitude.
The policy of radical localization, established through the
Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations, requires individuals
to make certain crucial decisions about their identity and moral
purpose in relative isolation from the people who make up nearby
political communities. Because the most obvious effect ofthis policy
is the allocation of decision-making authority to the individual, it is
possible to miss the extraordinary centralization on which this
privacy jurisprudence depends. The paradoxical, if obvious, fact is
that these decisions to disqualify larger jurisdictions were made by
an institution of the national government, itself the largest available
jurisdiction. In order for federal judges to determine the appropriate role of state and local governments in decisions that are central
to self-definition and self-fulfillment, it is necessary for them to
decide matters of, to say the least, considerable intimacy. Thus, the
cases routinely contain discussions about the nature of marriage,
the basis of the parent/child bond, the experience of dying, the
psychological significance of homosexual acts, and the impact of
abortion on women and their families. While in some instances the
privacy decisions result in radical localization of decision making, in
all instances they represent the nationalization of discussion about
highly personal matters.
The judiciary's nationalization of intimacy is intellectually
possible only as a part of a much broader shift in the public's
understanding of the role of the federal government. This shift is a
consequence of a complex but familiar set of legal and cultural
factors, including the rise and maturation of the regulatory state,
the existence of a national electronic media, high mobility rates,
secularization, and a reduction in participation in private associations. Because of these and other massive social changes, it has
gradually come to seem normal for Congress and the Executive
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Branch to take responsibility for matters such as the safety and
education of children, the structure of family life, the morality of
homosexual conduct, the quality of medical care, and sexual
relations at the job site. These specific shifts in policy-making
responsibility have been part of a fundamental change in popular
assumptions and expectations. It is now widely thought that the
central government is responsible not only for material welfare but
also for psychic gratification. 7 The Court's policy of radical
localization presupposes this centralization of attention and
responsibility because it assumes that the federal judiciary has
competence and responsibility to evaluate what personal decisions
are necessary for individual self-definition and personal fulfillment
and also what degree and kind of government control is consistent
with those lofty objectives.
It is a sign of how accomplished this centralization is that, while
the intermediate jurisdictions represented by state and local
governments are perceived as a threat to the utopian aspirations
animating the right to privacy, the fact that the national government is asserting jurisdiction over these matters seems a normal
fact of life. In fact, the inevitable effect of the Court's policy of
extreme localization is to redirect attention and political action on
intimate matters to all three institutions of the central government.
Constitutionalizing the right to privacy has meant that matters of
personal self-fulfillment are now debated and decided when the
Senate gives "advice and consent" on the President's nominees to
the courts, when Congress takes up proposals to expand or roll back
the Court's decisions, and when amendments to the Constitution are
proposed.
To summarize, the Court's privacy jurisprudence would be
unthinkable except as a part of a more general centralization of
power over intimate matters. The effect of the Court's decisions is
both to localize and nationalize decisions thought to be deeply
personal and pivotal. To a significant degree, then, public consideration of a range of sensitive issues takes place either at the national
stage, where even rough reformist aspirations seem threatened, or
at some radically localized setting, where the perfectionist impulse
runs free within small arenas.

17. See generally JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING
GovERNMENT AT CENTURY'S END (1998).
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It is, of course, not possible to be certain about the consequences
of this bifurcation of control over intimate issues. But perhaps
something can be learned from the strikingly parallel bifurcation
created by Americans' simultaneous devotion to privacy and
celebrity. As suggested at the outset of this article, these dual
commitments have meant that the most intimate aspects of our
leaders' lives are exposed at the remote level of national media
attention even while it is widely believed that everyone, including
those leaders, has a right to make decisions about intimate matters
within the isolation of their families. What have been the consequences of this bifurcation of control over personal matters? And
what do those consequences imply about the Court's policy of
simultaneously nationalizing and localizing our decision making on
issues like abortion, sexual behavior, and family life?
III.

The phenomenon of celebrity, like the constitutional right to
privacy, represents a form of centralization. Celebrity is a nationalized discourse on highly personal, even intimate matters.18 The
purpose of this discourse is to create an impression of familiarity
with individuals who are actually remote figures on the national
stage. Ordinary people identify with these celebrities and through
them try to achieve some sense of visibility and significance.
Despite the intense identification that can exist between the
members of the general public and celebrities, there cannot be, of
course, any intimate relationship between them. In fact, the only
sources of information about celebrities are printed articles,
televised appearances, and the like. The celebrity must create a
false appearance of intimacy. The personalized relationship
between famous figures and the public, then, is fundamentally a
fiction. The fiction is maintained by the scripting and staging of
what Daniel Boorstin calls "pseudo-events"-by the use of false and
manipulative language that purports to reveal private facts about
the celebrity, by displays of public emotionality, and by symbolic
acts, such as reaching out to touch members of an audience, that

18. Celebrityis discussed as an aspect ofnationalization in C. WRIGHTMiL9s,THEPoWER
ELrE 71-84 (1956), and more recently in RicHARD SCHICKEL, INTIMATE STRANGERS: THE
CULTURE OF CELEBRITY 183, 265-75 (1985).
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suggest closeness and availability.1 9 These tactics keep *public
attention on the celebrity and establish a superficial sense of
common understanding about the celebrity's subjective state. The
public can enjoy a sense of connection and significance even while
recognizing that the information allowing this experience not only
is abstract and false but also is controlled by unseen advisors and
publicists. That is, in order to achieve a sense of intimacy at great
distance, the public must treat as emotionally significant information that they know to be untestable and essentially contrived.2 ° In
short, to get the psychic benefits that celebrities can provide, people
must suspend their capacity for critical thought and even some of
their autonomy.2 When this submission to a staged narrative is
limited and self-aware, it has the quality of playfulness; however,
when participants fully lose themselves, their submission seems
pathetic, degraded, or even insane.2 2
No matter how false and unsatisfactory the discourse of celebrity
may be, it produces a kind of national culture, for even scripted
fictions can provide common identifications, aspirations, and
understandings.2 3 But celebrity, like the national right to privacy,
also leads to radical localization or, as it might be called in the
cultural context, atomization. Celebrities, after all, remain distant.
While people are allowed to view and discuss staged versions of
celebrities' private lives, the real celebrity remains largely unknown
to the public, and individual members of the public are completely
unknown to the celebrity. Even the relationships among members

19. See DANIELJ. BooRsTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA (1975).
On the inherent falseness of celebrity culture, see also SCHICKEL, supra note 18, at 7, 9, 18,
25, and P. DAviD MARSHALL, CELEBRITY AND POWER: FAME IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 21940 (1997).
20. See MARSHALL, supra note 19, at 17-18.
21. Boorstin puts it this way:
The American citizen thus lives in a world where fantasy is more real than
reality, where the image has more dignity than its original. We hardly dare face
our bewilderment, because our ambiguous experience is so pleasantly iridescent,
and the solace of belief in contrived reality is so thoroughly real.
BOORSTIN, supra note 19, at 37.
22. See id. The sacrifice of autonomous intellectual judgment is part of what characterizes
mass society, where attention is fixated on nationalized issues that are distant from daily life
and must be evaluated without either personal experience or the influence of intermediate
groups. See WILLIAM KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY 43-46, 75 (1959). It is
now recognized that, at the extreme, the urge to relate to public personalities and the closely
related need to achieve personal exposure can lead to horrific crimes. An early insight into
the possible connection between celebrity culture and criminal acts can be found in SCHICEEL,
supranote 18, at 3-9.
23. See SCHICKEL, supra note 18, at 141, 265, 275.
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of the public that are built on the culture of celebrity are thin, for
the saner, more playful participants in that culture understand the
fictional quality of their discourse. Hence, the individual remains
essentially alone while contemplating the lives of celebrities. The
culture of celebrity divides consideration of intimate matters
between an unsatisfactory national stage and people's private
imaginings.
Indeed, the centralized culture of celebrity tends to deplete other,
nearby communicative resources, increasing the isolation of private
life. As Richard Sennett points out, because celebrities inevitably
remain distant and essentially unknowable, the public demands
ever more refined signals about what the famous are "really like."'
The dismaying result, he claims, is that each display of intimate
information leads to further displays, a potentially endless process
from which people eventually withdraw into the characteristic
passivity of the modern audience. Moreover, Richard Schickel has
described how the constant glamorization and excitement surrounding celebrities distracts attention from more immediate real-world
events and relationships by making them seem dull and uninteresting.26 Because what is remote and essentially unverifiable seems
central, what can be understood through direct experience or
contacts comes to seem less important. The more life is lived
through private imaginings about the unconstrained and romanticized opportunities available for celebrities, the less tolerable are
the inevitable imperfections of ordinary social existence. Thus, the
culture of celebrity diminishes the public life that is available in
nearby associations. To revert to my earlier terminology, nationalization produces radical localization.
Because identification with famous figures can compensate for a
depleted sense of social connection, moral direction, and even

24. See RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PULIC MAN 195-97(1977); cf. BOORSTIN, supra

note 19, at 14.
25. See SENNETT, supra note 24, at 196.
26. See SCHICKEL, supranote 18, at 63.
By the time the 1920s ended, our world had not so much changed as it had
bifurcated. Or had begun to bifurcate. Our immediate, physical surroundings
had not changed, and our immediate personal concerns had not changed-not
radically at any rate. We were even still permitted public life of a sort in our
communities. But there was this trouble with it: it seemed to be very small
potatoes. Its rewards and recognitions seemed paltry compared to what was
going on elsewhere, where the images were made, where the truly glamorous
made work seem like play and fame was the spur.
Id.; see also SENNETr, supra note 24, at 183.
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political efficacy, this isolation produces powerful needs that
increase fascination with celebrities and thus promotes further
centralization." Indeed, the paradoxical effect ofradical localization
is to nurture utopian aspirations. The more existence is private and
self-centered, the more perfection seems attainable, and if life
should be perfect for each individual, it should be perfect for all.
This, of course, is the very egalitarian utopianism that finds a
practical outlet in the culture of celebrity.2" Radical localization
produces nationalization.
If celebrities were politically dangerous, this kind of bifurcated
culture-at once increasingly atomized and increasingly fixated on
national symbols-would bring to mind the ruthless mobilizations
that periodically have lead to authoritarian suppression in the
modern era.2 9 But the main influence of celebrities has to do with
the individual's search for validation, excitement, and pleasure in
private life, not politics and public policy. 0 Celebrities may draw
their power from a weak or even unhealthy culture, but they are not
potential tyrants. Except for some special cases (notably the
Hitlerian spectacles used to whip up the crowds watching professional wrestling), nothing seems further from authoritarianism than
the generally frivolous culture of celebrity. However, to the extent
that the bifurcated discourse on the right to privacy entails an
implosive dynamic, the possible implications are more troubling
because that discourse does involve public policy and political power.
Is there reason to think that the nationalized discourse on
intimate matters created by the right to privacy might, like the
culture of celebrity, be operating to set up an implosive cycle? At
first glance, such a comparison between celebrity and privacy seems
27. Cf KORNHAUSER, supra note 22, at 32, 109. A sense of understanding is projected
onto celebrities, like in public opinion polls, when people have become so undifferentiated and
disconnected that they have only a weak sense of themselves. See MARSHALL, supra note 19,
at 210.
28. The "perfection" that celebrity holds out is not a perfection of condition but a
perfection of excitement and choice-the same ideal of endless psychic potential that
underlies the rhetoric of the therapeutic state. Compare NOLAN supra note 17, at 20, with
BOORSTIN, supra note 19, at 4-5, 118.
29. See generallyKORNHAUSER, supranote 22, at42 (discussing the relationship betwveen
mass society and totalitarianism).
30. Celebrities do, of course, influence politics to a degree. See David S. Meyer, The
Challenge of CulturalElites: Celebritiesand Social Movements, 65 SOC. INQUIRY 181 (1995).
It is also true that the line between politician and celebrity is increasingly blurred. See
MARSHALL, supra note 19, at 203-40; Suzanne Keller, Celebrities and Politics: A New
Alliance, 2 RES. POL. SOC. 145 (1986). Still, the celebrity's main attraction has to do with
private pleasure seeking, not national identity and public power.
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far-fetched. For one thing, discourse on privacy does not center on
personalities in the way that discourse about celebrity does, and,
consequently, would not seem to involve the same kinds of emotional investments. Even without identification with specific
personalities, however, the national stage can be a potent forum for
personal affirmation if devoted to highly personal issues. For
instance, the Supreme Court's depiction of the motive behind
Colorado's Amendment 2 as "animus" against homosexuals 31 has
had profound psychic and symbolic importance for many members
of the gay-rights movement who see in that word a vindication of
their sexual behavior.3 2 A correlative sense of invisibility and
rejection has been keenly felt by many who see in that same opinion
3
a repudiation of their own sense of normalcy and morality.
Similarly, part of the significance of the Court's emphatic refusal to
overrule Roe v. Wade34 was to provide psychological support for the
millions of women who in recent decades have forsaken traditional
domestic roles in favor of a place in the working world.3 5 As for the

31. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
32. Consider this reaction:
What was shocking about Bowers was the tone of it; the opinion drips with
contempt for lesbians and gay men. The disdain and scorn was as raw and
uninhibited as it is on the most dangerous American street after dark....
... But... Bowers... is dead. It is dead because of the tone of Romer.
Romer treats lesbians and gay men with respect ....
... To explain what I mean, I want to tell you about the first time I read
the Romer opinion.
It was May 26, 1996, a date I suspect I will always remember. I was
sitting on my shabby little couch in my seedy little office ....
[Tihe Court was speaking not to lawyers, but to the country as a
...
I choked up when I read [the quote from Justice Harlan's dissent
whole ....
in Plessy] because I never really believed I would read them in a U.S.
The message could not have been
Supreme Court opinion.
clearer.... [S]exual orientation discrimination... is just plain wrong, and
good people in a civilized society do not countenance it.
Matthew Coles, The Meaning ofRomer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343, 1357-61 (1997)
(footnotes omitted).
33. Contributors to the famous symposium, The End of Democracy? The Judicial
UsurpationofPolitics, reacted to Romer by saying that the Court "made what used to be its
most loyal citizens-religious believers-enemies of the common good," Russell Hittinger, A
Crisis of Legitimacy, 67 FIRST THINGS 25, 28 (1996), "pronounce[d] the traditional moral
teaching of Judaism and Christianity as empty, irrational, and unjustified," Hadley Arkes,
A CultureCorrupted,67 FIRSTTHINGS 30,32(1996), and "branded [as] a bigot any citizen who
considers homosexuality immoral," Charles W. Colson, Kingdoms in Conflict, 67 FIRST
THINGS 34, 34 (1996).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. Or so the Court itself seemed to say. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855-56 (1992).
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psychic impact on traditionalists of Roe itself, consider the words of
one woman, a homemaker, who believed that her own birth had
resulted from an unwanted pregnancy, remembering the day she
read about the decision in her newspaper: "'And it was [my son]
Jamie's birthday. And I sat down, I was very upset ....
I wanted
to cry in a way.... All these things in my personal life... all came
together in one."'36
Because the process of formulating and imposing policies on
highly intimate matters inevitably requires that the institutions of
the central government make some people feel noticed and validated
and others ignored and rejected, national decision makers-like
celebrities-can come to be seen as larger than life. Robert Bork was
invested by some with devilish traits and intentions and by others
with a superhuman intellect. Harry Blackmun was alternatively
shot at in his home and hugged in public. One sophisticated
journalist said that to thank President Clinton for keeping abortion
legal, she would be willing to provide him with sexual gratification.3"
Such intensely personal reactions, growing out of official stands on
privacy issues, surely confirm that those issues are significant not
only as substantive matters of public policy, but also as symbolic
matters of psychic affirmation. Indeed, these reactions indicate that
policies on the right to privacy have such psychic meaning that the
discourse on privacy and the discourse on celebrity are sometimes
indistinguishable.
Nevertheless, the declaration and enforcement of privacy rights
at the national level does not at first seem to involve a submission
to manipulation and unreality in the way that the culture of
celebrity does. Indeed, the debate over the constitutional right to
privacy is often couched in philosophical terms. What could be more
different, one might wonder, than an essentially trivial and false
public fascination with celebrities and a profound constitutional

36. KkisTrN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 137-38 (1984). Luker
quoted another woman as follows:
While I was pregnant, somebody said something about abortions [being
performed] at five months, and I was about four and a half months pregnant at
the time, and I thought, "Five months! I can feel this baby kicking and moving
inside of me and I just heard the heart begin to beat, what do you mean they're
giving abortions at five months!"
Id. at 148.
37. See Howard Kurtz, A Reporter with Lust in Her Hearts,WASH. POST, July 6, 1998, at
C1. The statement was made by Nina Burleigh, a former White House correspondent for Time
magazine. See id.
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discourse on issues like abortion, homosexuality, and the right to
die?
On closer inspection, however, the high political discourse on
privacy does seem to involve fictionalized narratives contrived by
unseen professionals. For instance, while the American public
knows that there are federal rules governing sexual behavior in the
workplace, the source of these rules is largely mysterious. They
were authorized through an arcane process of statutory interpretation by the federal judiciary; their specific content has been
generated largely in various federal administrative agencies that
are run by faceless experts who are themselves influenced by
lawyers and more experts. The government's rules involve immediate and highly intimate matters, but the authorities who produce
these rules, as well as the intellectual processes used by these
authorities, are distant and unseen. Most people, of course, accept
the rules and try to live by them without much thought about their
specific sources. But this submission involves a degree of
fictionalization because the rules treat intimate matters in ways
that do not accord with ordinary experience. Some of their main
premises-for example, that the workplace is an inappropriate place
for sexual flirtation or that sexual advances toward women with
subordinate status are inherently exploitative-are wildly improbable to most Americans, as was emphatically demonstrated by the
success of President Clinton's argument that any sexual improprieties between him and a female intern in his offices were a private
matter. Millions of Americans in workplaces across the country
nevertheless submit to regulations that must seem to them strange,
a mysteriously scripted national account of human sexuality that
has intense psychic significance but that is, in important respects,
unreal.
Even when privacy rights have a visible author, they have a
disconnected, dreamlike quality. Americans, of course, know that
the justices of the Supreme Court, especially the late Harry
Blackmun, are the source of the constitutional right to abortion.
Moreover, the public can read accounts of how these jurists explain
the existence of the right. But those accounts are famously and
profoundly confusing, accessible-if at all-only to professionals who
make claims to specialized understandings about constitutional
interpretation, stare decisis, and the like. Even where the judicial
opinions appeal to kinds of knowledge that should be generally
available, as when they describe fundamental American political
traditions, the source of the right to abortion remains remote and
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obscure. At the extreme, the Court's depictions of those traditions
read less like verifiable history than like calculated myth-building.
Indeed, the Casey decision combines inaccuracy and grandiosity in
a way that is not far different from, say, the filmed accounts of the
lives of presidential nominees now routinely shown at national
political conventions. 8
More generally, now that the abortion debate has been nationalized, the dominant political rhetoric is increasingly fictionalized.
Most people in their daily lives do not see abortion as a mere
medical procedure or an exalted attribute of citizenship, but they do
not see it as the exact equivalent of murder either. Yet these are
the defining polar positions of the national debate.3 9 One side
defends even partial-birth abortions while the other imagines a
constitutional right to life from the moment of conception. Americans live, numbed but morbidly fascinated, under a scripted

38. Political biographies, of course, take grains of truth and exaggerate them into selfserving melodrama. One part of the melodrama is the depiction of the candidate, whose
policy positions have, of course, been deeply compromised and varied through the years, as
having been consistently devoted to inspiring ideals. Similarly, in Casey the Court describes
its privacy decisions by first quoting from a few cases involving such matters as the right to
use contraceptives and to educate children; it then depicts these cases as involving "the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy."Id. at 851. Building quickly to a crescendo, the justices conclude that
"[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Id. As if this were not enough exaggeration
and self-importance for one opinion, the Court then declares that, "[tihe destiny of the woman
must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her
place in society." Id. at 852.
A second component of the propagandistic biography is the portrayal of the
candidate's life story as heroic-showing the candidate rising from humble circumstances,
overcoming enormous adversity, and standing as a bulwark against social and political
disintegration. A similar, if not more grandiose, institutional biography of the Supreme
Court's role in the abortion controversy is offered in Casey. The Court in Roe, say the Casey
justices, called "the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division
by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution." Id. at 867. This brave endeavor
was then threatened by "political pressure," even "fire." Id. In response, the Court remained
"steadfast" to those who had accepted the "rule of law." Id. at 868. This "promise of
constancy," the "obligation of this promise," binds the justices still, for a "willing breach of it
would be nothing less than a breach of faith." Id. Like any hero, of course, the Court is not
concerned that such a breach of faith would affect self-interest. "The Court's concern with
legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court.... ." Id. No! What is at stake is nothing so
mundane as the power of the judiciary to enforce its will. On the contrary, what is at stake
is the American people's belief in themselves as "a Nation of people who aspire to live
according to the rule of law." Id.
39. See JAMES DAViSON HUNTER, CuLTuRE WARs: THE STRuGGLE TO DEFMNEAMERICA 16070 (1991) (describing and attempting to explain "the eclipse of the middle").
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national account of abortion that does not accord with ordinary
experience and moral intuition.
There are many reasons why national policies on issues like
sexual behavior and abortion do not track common understandings.
For one thing, a discourse carried on at that distance is inevitably
funneled through national opinion leaders whose lives have been
dominated by intense interest in a narrow set of issues. Moreover,
these leaders are influenced by the relatively extreme demands of
the energized components of their membership, and this energetic
component is likely to be seeking in national policy not only
substantive results but also a personalized symbolism. Like public
relations advisors to celebrities, these leaders and the experts on
whom they rely contrive events and manipulate language to produce
a script that calls attention to their issues in an exaggerated way.
Even as the terms of this debate become more intimate and
extreme, they mean less and so must be inflated yet again. In 1991,
the nation was shocked by the allegations, made and explored in
nationally televised confirmation hearings, that Clarence Thomas
used explicit sexual language in conversations with Anita Hill, an
employee of his agency. By 1999, the same shock value could not be
produced by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's lengthy and
detailed account of specific sexual acts committed by President
Clinton with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, an account
made available to all in interminable televised reports, in book form,
and on the Internet. Or, to use a different kind of illustration, in
1992, Congress debated whether to reinstate the so-called "trimester
scheme" imposed on the nation by Roe v. Wade and then abandoned
by the Court in Casey.4" This debate required public consideration
of the consequences and wisdom of restricting abortions prior to
approximately the sixth month of pregnancy. By 1996, Congress
was debating the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,4 ' a debate that
required both an explicit description and a moral defense of a
procedure whereby the fetus's head is crushed while the fetus is
emerging from the birth canal.42 People cannot help, of course, but
pay attention to information about Clinton's sexual behavior or the
gruesome details of late-term abortions, but intimate policy issues,
like the intimate details of celebrities' lives, remain essentially

40. See Freedom of Choice Act of 1992, S. 25, 102d Cong. (1992).
41. H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1996).
42. See id.
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distant and abstract so that more detail is constantly needed. Even
as they watch, people withdraw in embarrassment and dismay.
They tend, however, not to withdraw into more localized political
and associational settings where privacy issues might be debated
with more moderation and more sense of reality. The glamour and
excess of nationalized policy-making delegitimizes intermediate
decision makers either directly (by limiting their jurisdiction) or
indirectly (by making the terminology of immediate experience seem
common, dull, or even prejudiced). While watching the national
debate, therefore, people turn away from nearby social interactions
toward the seclusion of their own private lives.
These private lives, of course, cannot be lived as if there were no
national debate on intimate matters. They are inevitably influenced
by the unconstrained ideological standards set by the national
debate on privacy. The greater this influence, the less tolerable are
the remaining compromises imposed by society. The process of
utopian withdrawal builds on itself. Just as fascination with
celebrity increases in response to the atomization that celebrity
causes, the withdrawal caused by the nationalization of privacy
policy unleashes a perfectionism that builds back toward the grand
stage of national policy-making.
In promoting and, indeed, romanticizing the term "privacy," the
institutions of the national government promote the illusion that
individuals are sovereign jurisdictions," entitled to and able to
exercise the most significant personal liberties without concern for
others. Under this illusion, each person lives in a separate glassedin space, freed from frustration and compromise in a jurisdiction so
small that it is possible to imagine a costless perfection. And this
utopianism eventually finds its outlet again in the coercive rules
mandated by the central government.
Americans, therefore, increasingly understand intimate matters
from the vantage points of two opposite dream states-one where
standards are impersonally scripted and collective, the other where
autonomous individuals are free to pursue their happiness without
consequences for others. Both of these states are false and inevitably
dissatisfying, and the danger is that the oscillation between them is
implosive, that atomized individuals will increasingly try to realize
their utopian aspirations by subjecting their most personal needs

43. See generally Feinberg, supranote 3.
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and understandings to the ungrounded scripts of national regulation.
IV.
Notwithstanding the bleak depiction just offered, I recognize that
the bifurcation of discourse about private matters can be-and in
influential circles generally is-viewed as a healthy development. In
fact, there is virtual unanimity in our culture that individuals, along
with those closest to them, are the right venue for immediate control
over personal decisions. Moreover, even if the extent to which
centralized regulation shapes and constrains those personal
decisions is not fully appreciated, a national forum on privacy issues
is widely accepted as appropriate. Indeed, the consensus, at least
in most intellectual circles, is that discourse at that level is likely to
be more enlightened and less parochial than the discourse available
at the state and local levels. Even the exaggeration, the posturing,
and the abstraction of nationalized debate can be seen as advantages because they allow for the kind of vividness and inspiration
necessary for high moralism and intense politics. And I do not deny
that centralized discourse can have these advantages. Just such
advantages, for example, characterized the civil rights movement of
the 1960s, a movement that undoubtedly produced great social
advances on issues, like marriage and education, that have profoundly personal aspects. When nationalized moral direction ofthis
kind is combined with a strong legal commitment to cordon off-areas
for autonomous personal decision-making, the combination is
powerfully attractive. It is not hard to see why American political
culture so highly values both the nationalization of intimacy and
what it calls the right to privacy.
Like any complex social phenomenon, our nationalized discourse
on intimate matters can have great advantages at the same time
that it poses dangers. Indeed, the advantages may create the
dangers. Confident, realistic, self-reliant individuals-the kind who
can make good personal decisions and also keep the excesses of
centralized political discourse in perspective-tend to emerge from
the intermediate terrain that bifurcation gradually consumes.
Perhaps more than its many advocates appreciate, then, the
successes of currently dominant model might depend on the degree
to which it has so far triumphed only incompletely.
The implosive dynamic that I have tried to describe is, therefore,
troubling. Already there are obvious signs of political passivity,
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selfishness, and moralistic collectivism. To some degree the citizenry is now an audience, submitting its sense of reality to a
national discourse while withdrawing into private dreams of perfect
satisfaction. Worse, as I have tried to explain, there are reasons to
think that this is a process that builds on itself. Needless to say,
American society remains amazingly varied, layered, and healthy.
The danger, then, is real but limited by the rich experiential
resources still available to people in their immediate social interactions. Efforts to create national solutions to the problems of personal life, as powerfully attractive as they can be, deplete those
resources.

